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VOLUME  49  JULY, 1981  NUMBER 4 
THE CLASSICAL THEOREM ON EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE 
EQUILIBRIUM1 
BY LIONEL W.  MCKENZIE 
This  paper presents the classical  theorem on  the  existence  of  equilibrium as  it  was 
proved in the  1950's with the various improvements that have been made since then. In 
particular, the elimination of the survival assumption and of the requirement of transitive 
preferences are carried through with a proof that uses a mapping of social demand. This 
approach favors intuitive understanding and generalization of the results. Finally, the role 
of the firm and the introduction of external economies are critically viewed. 
MY  PURPOSE  IS  TO  DISCUSS  the  present  status  of  the  classical  theorem  on 
existence  of  competitive  equilibrium that was  proved in  various guises in  the 
1950's by Arrow and Debreu [1], Debreu [5, 6], Gale [8], Kuhn [14], McKenzie 
[17,  18,  19], and  Nikaido  [22]. The  earliest papers were  those  of  Arrow and 
Debreu,  and  McKenzie,  both  of  which  were  presented  to  the  Econometric 
Society at its Chicago meeting in December,  1952. They were written indepen- 
dently. The paper of Nikaido was also written independently of the other papers 
but delayed in publication. 
The major predecessors of the papers of the fifties were the papers of Abraham 
Wald [31, 32] and John von Neumann  [30], all of which were delivered to Karl 
Menger's Colloquium in Vienna during the  1930's. The paper of von Neumann 
was not concerned with competitive equilibrium in the classical sense but with a 
program of maximal balanced growth in a closed production model. However, he 
first used  a  fixed  point  theorem for an  existence  argument in  economics  and 
provided the generalization of the Brouwer theorem that was the major mathe- 
matical  tool  in  the  classical  proofs.  Wald  achieved  the  first success  with  the 
general problem  of  the  existence  of  a  meaningful  solution  to  the  Walrasian 
system of equations. The proofs which were published used an assumption that 
later became  known  as  the Weak Axiom  of  Revealed  Preference. This  axiom 
virtually reduces the set of  consumers to  one  person, since  it  is equivalent to 
consistent  choices  under budget  constraints. In  a  one  consumer economy  the 
existence of the equilibrium becomes a simple maximum problem and advanced 
methods are not  needed.  When many  consumers with independent preference 
orders are present, it has been shown (Uzawa [29]) that fixed point methods are 
necessary. Wald also wrote a third paper whose main theorem was announced in 
a  summary article [33], but which  never reached publication  in  the  disturbed 
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conditions  of  Vienna  of  the  period.  This  theorem  does  not  make  the  Weak 
Axiom assumption and presumably fixed point methods were used in the proof. 
However, the paper apparently has not survived and did not directly influence 
the writers of the fifties. 
The classical theorem is characterized above all by its use of assumptions of 
finiteness  and  convexity.  That  is,  the  economy  comprises a  finite  number  of 
economic agents or consumers who trade in a single market under conditions of 
certainty. The goods are finite in number and, as a consequence, the horizon is 
finite. Goods  are divisible, and production is modeled  either as a set of  linear 
activities in  the space of  goods  or as convex  input-output sets belonging  to  a 
finite list of firms. Consumption sets and preference relations are also convex in 
an appropriate sense. Consumption and production activities are mutually inde- 
pendent. 
In subsequent years the abstract model of an economy  has been complicated 
for the existence theorems in many directions, principally weakening the crucial 
finiteness and convexity assumptions. However, somewhat surprisingly, in recent 
years the classical theorem itself has been  improved in basic ways by  Andreu 
Mas-Colell  and  James  Moore.  Mas-Colell  [16] and  Gale  and  Mas-Colell  [9] 
showed  that preferences need  not  be  assumed  transitive or  complete.  On  the 
other hand,  Moore  [21] showed  that  the  assumption  that agents  may  survive 
without trade is superfluous for an irreducible economy. 
In this paper I will introduce these innovations into an exposition based on the 
use of demand functions and production sets. I believe this order of proof is best 
for economic understanding and also for achieving the weakest assumptions. In 
particular, the Mas-Colell-Gale assumptions are weakened and a way is found to 
incorporate a version of  the Moore result without returning to classical prefer- 
ences. I shall also discuss three other themes that have been pursued in recent 
papers, the inclusion of  external economies affecting production and consump- 
tion sets, the representation of  firms as coalitions of  economic  agents, and  the 
elimination of the free disposal assumption by new means. 
1.  THE  CLASSICAL  THEOREM 
I will use the theorem of my paper of  1959 to represent the classical theorem 
on  existence  in  fully  developed  form.  The  assumptions  of  this  theorem  fall 
naturally into three groups, assumptions on the consumption sets Xi, on the total 
production set Y, and on the relations between these sets. First, for the consump- 
tion sets, which lie in R",  the Cartesian product of n real lines, we assume 
(1)  Xi is convex, closed, and bounded from below. 
(2)  Xi is completely ordered by a convex and closed preference relatioTn. 
Xi is interpreted as the set of feasible trades of the ith consumer. There are m 
consumers. That Xi is bounded  from below means that there is {i such that x > 4, 
holds for all x E Xi. Convexity of the preference relation > i means that x >- ix' THEOREM  ON EXISTENCE  821 
implies x" >-ix' where x" =  tx + (1 -  t)x',  for 0 <  t <  1. Closure of  XJi means 
that xs-x  and xS ox',where  x'>x  implies xKx'. 
For the total production set Y, which also lies in R ',  we assume 
(3)  Y is a closed convex cone. 
(4)  Y n R+ = {0}. 
R  + is the nonnegative cone of Rn. 
The assumption that Y is a cone recognizes the role of constant returns to scale 
as a basis for perfect competition. It may be defended as an approximation when 
efficient firm sizes are small, and in this sense was accepted by both Marshall 
and Walras. It may be argued that the error of this approximation is of the same 
order as the error introduced by the assumption of convexity in the presence of 
indivisible goods. In any case the assumption of convex production sets for firms 
may be  shown to be  mathematically equivalent to Assumption  (3) (McKenzie 
[19, pp. 66-67];  also see McKenzie [20]). Assumption (4) is not a real restriction. 
It amounts to ignoring goods that are available in any desired quantities without 
cost. In this model the consumption sets Xi are net of initial stocks, that is, the 
elements of Xi are possible trades. 
Finally, there are two assumptions on the relations between the Xi and  Y. Let 
X  = E'Xi,  where m is the number of consumers. Then the first assumption is: 
(5)  Xi n  Y /  0.  Moreover, there is a common point x-  in the 
relative interiors of Y and X. 
The first part of this assumption states that any consumer can survive without 
trade. The second part implies that we may choose  the price space so that any 
price p that supports Y will have p *  x < 0 for some x E X. In other words, if p is 
compatible with equilibrium in the production sector, there is a feasible trade for 
the group of all consumers with negative value. This may be interpreted as saying 
that some consumer has income, in the sense that he is not on the boundary of 
his consumption set. 
Suppose there are m consumers. Let I,  and I2 be nonempty sets of indices for 
consumers  such that I, n  I2 = 0  and I,  U I2 =  {1,  ..  . , mi).  Let X1' 
=  i  =IXi 
and X,, 
=  Ei  Xik  for k =  1,2. The second relation  between  the Xi and Y is: 
(6)  However I,  and I2 may be selected, if x1, =Y  -XI2  with x1, E XI, 
y E  Y, and x,2 E  XI,2  then there is alsoy'  E Y, and w E X,,, such that 
xly  -  -  w and xi'  > ixi for all i E I,,  and xi'  >- ixi for some 
i E II. 
An alternative way of expressing the condition of (6), by substituting for x,2, is 
x-  = y'  -  y -  w. That is, I,  may be moved to a preferred position by the 
addition of a vector y'  -  y  from the local cone of  Y at y  (see Koopmans [13, p. 
83]) plus a feasible trade from I2. The resource relatedness assumption of Arrow 
and Hahn [2, p. 117], implies Assumption (6), but the converse is not true. Since 
they assume that a household can survive with less of all the resources it holds (p. 822  LIONEL W. MCKENZIE 
77), they are able to take w equal to a small fraction of the resources held by I2 
consumers. Then it is supposed that I,  consumers can be benefited with this w. 
The  purpose  of  Assumption  (6)  is  to  insure  that  everyone  has  income,  if 
someone has income, at any price vector that supports the production set Y at y 
as well as the sets of consumption vectors at least as good as xi, at the points xi. 
Then if we choose I,  to contain just the indices of the consumers with income, 
nonempty by Assumption (5), p * x,l > 0 must hold. Also  Assumption (6) with 
Assumption (2) implies local nonsatiation within the feasible set X  n  Y so that 
p * x,,=  0. Sincep  y = 0 andp  -y'  < 0, it follows thatp  - w < 0.  But w E  X,2  so 
some consumer in  I2  has income in contradiction to the choice  of  II.  Thus I2 
must be empty, and the result follows. 
Competitive equilibrium is defined by a price vector p E Rn, an output vector 
y,  and vectors xl,  . ..  , x,m of consumer trades that satisfy 
(I)  y  E  Yandp*y=0,andforanyy'E  Y,p  y'  < 0. 
(II)  x, e  Xi andp  - xi < 0, and xi ~ix'  for any x' E  Xi 
such that  p - x' < 0,  i-1  = I  M.m 
i=  1 
The  first condition  corresponds to  Walras' requirement that  in  equilibrium 
there should  be  "ni benefice,  ni  perte" [34, p.  225].  It  is  not  possible  for  a 
combination  of  resources to  be  formed  that  allows  larger payments  to  some 
resource than those implied by p.  Resources belonging  to  "entrepreneurs" are 
priced along with hired factors, and the entire income of a productive activity is 
imputed  to  the  cooperating  factors.  This  is  the  traditional picture  of  perfect 
competition in Marshall [15], as well as in Walras. 
The second condition implies that consumers maximize preference over their 
budget sets. Debts and taxes are ignored in the classical theorems, though many 
writers have introduced them subsequently. The third condition  says that con- 
sumer trades sum to the total production. Given p  y = 0 andp  *  xi < 0 it follows 
from condition (III) thatp  *  xi = 0. 
We make the following definition. 
DEFINITION:  A  competitive  equilibrium  is  a  set  of  vectors  (p,  y, x1, ...,) 
that satisfy conditions (I), (II), and (III). 
An economy E may be defined by E = (Y,Xi,  ,i, i =  1, . .  .m,  ). One form of 
the classical theorem on the existence of a competitive equilibrium is: 
THEOREM  1: If an economy E satisfies the Assumptions  (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and 
(6), there is a competitive  equilibrium  for E. 
Debreu [7] has defined a weaker notion of equilibrium which he calls "quasi- 
equilibrium." A  quasi-equilibrium in  our setting satisfies (I)  and  (III),  but  in THEOREM  ON  EXISTENCE  823 
place of (II) there is: 
(Ilq)  xi E Xi andp  p  xi < 0, and xi,ci x' for any x' E Xi such that 
p  *x'-S  ,  ,or  p  *xi<Sp  *x'for  all x'  EXi,  i =1,.  . .,m. 
Debreu's strategy for proving existence of equilibrium in this paper is to prove 
that a quasi-equilibrium exists and then introduce a further assumption which 
implies that a quasi-equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium. Arrow and Hahn 
[2], and  James Moore  [21], follow  the  same strategy using  the  closely  related 
notion of a "compensated equilibrium." A compensated equilibrium replaces (II) 
by: 
(IIc)  xi E Xi andp  *  xi <  0, andp  *  xi < p *  x' 
for any x' E Xi such that x' > ixi. 
If indifference sets may be  thick, (Ilq)  is a weaker condition  than (Ilc).  In 
particular, when all consumers have income (Ilc) implies Pareto optimality, while 
(IIq) does not. However, under our assumptions, these concepts are equivalent. 
The  assumption  that  converts  a  proof  that  a  quasi-equilibrium exists,  given 
Assumption (2), into a proof of  existence for competitive equilibrium is essen- 
tially  irreducibility,  our  Assumption  (6).  These  assumptions  insure  that  all 
consumers have income at a quasi-equilibrium, so the second alternative of (IIq) 
does not  occur and  the condition  of  (IIq) implies (II).  Since we  are primarily 
interested in competitive equilibrium, we will not use this order of proof. 
2.  THE  SURVIVAL  ASSUMPTION 
Perhaps the  most  dramatic innovation  since  1959 is  the  discovery  that  the 
survival assumption, that is, the first part of Assumption (5), Xi n  Y 7  0,  can be 
dispensed with in  the presence of  the  other assumptions, in  particular in  the 
presence of  Assumption  (6) that the economy  is irreducible. In retrospect this 
seems  a  plausible  result.  However,  it  was  hidden  by  the  character  of  the 
mappings used in  the early proofs. These mappings involve  demand functions 
defined on price vectors that are normal to the production set. Then p  y  <  0 for 
all y  E  Y, and in particular for y E Xi n  Y. This means that the budget set is 
never  empty  and  the  demand  function  is  always  well  defined.  The  demand 
function may not be upper semi-continuous when the budget plane supports Xi, 
but  the modified  function  defined  by  Debreu  [7] even  has  this property. The 
modified function defines the demand set, when the budget plane supports Xi, as 
the intersection of  Xi and  the budget  set. Then  condition  (IIq)  of  the  quasi- 
equilibrium will be satisfied. 
On the other hand,  the mapping used by Arrow and  Hahn  to prove that a 
compensated equilibrium exists avoids mapping by means of a demand function 
by giving the Pareto frontier in the space of consumers' utilities a central role. 
Then the mapping can go forward even if prices are used for which the budget 
set, defined relative to Xi, is empty. Arrow and Hahn map a Cartesian product of 
a  normalized  price  set,  a  set  of  normalized  utility  vectors  from  the  Pareto 824  LIONEL W. MCKENZIE 
efficient frontier, and a set of feasible allocations of goods into convex subsets. 
The  Pareto  efficient  frontier is  the  set  of  feasible  utility  allocations  {  ui  },  i 
=  1, . ..  , m, such that there exists no feasible allocation {  u'} with ul >  ui for all 
i.  If  indifference  sets  may  be  thick,  this  mapping  need  not  be  upper  semi- 
continuous,  so  it  cannot  be  used  with  Debreu's  assumptions.  Moreover,  a 
compensated equilibrium is Pareto efficient if someone has income,  though not 
necessarily Pareto optimal, while a  quasi-equilibrium may  not  be  even  Pareto 
efficient. The key  to  this distinction is  that at a quasi-equilibrium spending is 
maximized  for  the  utility  levels  achieved.  Therefore,  it  may  be  possible  to 
increase everyone's utility without increasing total spending. But when spending 
is minimized for the utility levels achieved, and there is someone with income, 
this is no  longer possible  since to increase this consumer's utility his spending 
must go up, and no one can reduce spending without losing utility. 
Arrow and  Hahn  still made  the survival assumption, but James Moore  [21] 
who uses the Arrow-Hahn mapping with small modifications dispenses with this 
assumption and  replaces it  for  the purpose of  compensated  equilibrium by  a 
weakened version of  irreducibility. Moore  also  uses a  slightly different Pareto 
frontier defined as the set of utility allocations {  ui  3 such that ui <  ui.  for all i, for 
some feasible {  u,'), but there is no feasible {  u1")  such that u,"  >  ui for all i. This 
allows him to drop the free disposal assumption implicitly made by Arrow and 
Hahn when they define equilibrium [2, p.  108]. 
I think there are advantages to the use of the demand function, or correspon- 
dence, in proofs of existence, both for mathematical power and for understand- 
ing  the proof. I will show how  the demand correspondence may be  used in a 
mapping of the Cartesian product of the price simplex and the social consump- 
tion  set  into  itself  whose  fixed  points  are  competitive  equilibria even  in  the 
absence of the survival assumption. At the equilibrium the budget sets will not be 
empty,  the  demand  correspondences  will  be  well  defined  and  upper  semi- 
continuous, but these conditions need not be satisfied for non-equilibrium prices. 
We will avoid the difficulties posed by this possibility by using an extension of 
the demand correspondence which reduces to the original correspondence when- 
ever the original correspondence is well defined  and  nonempty.  The  extended 
demand correspondence will be well defined and nonempty for all price vectors. 
We  will  first  prove  the  special  existence  theorem  in  which  an  interiority 
assumption is made. Then the general theorem is proved by a limiting argument 
in which the interior is removed. This argument will be sketched later. Therefore, 
we make the six assumptions listed in Section  1 except that Assumption (6) is 
slightly weakened, and Assumption (5) is replaced by 
(5')  X n interior Y :# 0. 
Assumption  (5') is used as  we  explained earlier to  insure that someone  has 
income  at any price vector that supports Y. Then Assumption (6) will provide 
income  to  everyone  in  equilibrium. The  interior point  of  (5')  is  a  temporary 
expedient for proving the special theorem. It is needed for the order of proof that THEOREM  ON EXISTENCE  825 
we use since we project points of the social consumption set on the boundary of 
Y from an interior point of  Y. The projection is then continous. 
I will sometimes appeal to the results of my Econometrica paper of  1959 [19] 
and Debreu's paper of 1962 [7] in the subsequent argument. Let Xi be the convex 
hull of Xi and  {0}.  Since 0 E  Y, the survival assumption is met in its original 
form of Assumption (5) in the economy with Xi. We also introduce: 
AUXILIARY  ASSUMPTION:  The  Xi  are bounded. 
This assumption is innocuous  since X  n  Y is bounded  as a consequence  of 
Assumption  (1), Xi  bounded  below,  and  Assumption  (4),  Y n  R  {0}.  See 
Lemmas 8 and 9 of McKenzie [19]. 
Assumption (6) is weakened by choosing w from X,2 rather than XI2. 
(6')  However I, and I2 may be selected, if x1, =y-XI2  with xj, E XI,, 
y  E  Y, and  E X,2  then there is alsoy'  E  Y, and w E  XI2, such that 
x  = y'-  -w  and xi'> x1 for all i E  II, andx' >-  ixi for 
some i E  II. 
This revision of (6) is a significant weakening unless 0 E  Xi. If 0 E  Xi is assumed 
as in McKenzie  [20], X,2 and Y,2are  the same. The revision is in accord with 
Assumption (e.4') used by Moore [21]. 
We will define an extension of the demand correspondence to the set Xi. We 
first define a correspondence 
(i(p)  =  {x  I  p *  x S 0 and xtiz  for all z E  Xi such thatp  *  z < 0}. 
This is the usual demand correspondence adapted to our case where income is 
zero, since entrepreneurial  resources absorb profits and all resources are included 
as  components  of  the  vectors  in  Xi.  The  correspondence  (i  will  be  upper 
semi-continous when there is a cheaper point in Xi, that is, a point x  such that 
p *  x < 0.  However,  this property fails  on  the  boundary  of  Xi.  Therefore, we 
define a modification of  the demand correspondence in the manner of Debreu 
by 
4i(p)  =  Q(p)  if there is x E  Xi andp  *  x <  0, 
4i(p)  =  { x E Xip  x =  O},  otherwise. 
Then '4i(p) is well defined for all p,  since 0 E  Xi by  the definition  of Xi. It is 
easily seen that 4'i(p) is upper semi-continuous (see Debreu [7, Lemmas 1 and 2]). 
We will use a mapping of  the Cartesian product of a normalized price set S 
with the extended consumption set X, which can be interpreted as taking prices 
into  demand  sets,  by  means  of  the  demand  correspondences,  and  possible 
consumptions into the normalized price set by an inverse supply correspondence. 826  LIONEL W. MCKENZIE 
The  mapping  is  so  defined  that  a  fixed  point  will  be  an  equilibrium. The 
mapping of prices into a social demand set is given by f(p)  =  Em=  %4i(p).  Let y 
lie in the interior of Y. The normalized price set S is defined as S =  {  p I  p *  y  < 0, 
for all y  E Y, and p  Y =  - 1}.  The set S is convex and compact since Y has an 
interior and  Y #  R'  (see McKenzie [19, Lemma 5]). 
In  order to  map  possible  consumptions  into  the  price  set  S,  we  define  a 
projection on the boundary of  Y from y.  Let  7T(x) be the maximum number ST 
such that y + ST (x  -  y)  E  Y. It is possible to choose IY-I  large enough so that the 
function  'T(x)  is well defined for x E  X.  See Appendix  I for a proof. Then let 
h(x)  = y  + g'(x)(x  -  y).  Then  define,  for  any  y  E boundary Y, g(y)  =  {p  E 
SIp  *y = 0}.  It may be shown that h is continuous, and also that g(y)  is upper 
semi-continuous. We may think of g o h as an inverse supply correspondence. 
Now  define  the  correspondence F(p, x) = ((g  o h)(x), f(p)).  F  maps  S  X  X 
into  the  collection  of  subsets  of  S X X.  The  subsets  (g  o h)(x)  and f(p)  are 
convex and not empty. Also f  is upper semi-continous, since 4'i  is for each i, h is 
continuous, and g  is upper semi-continous. Since g  and h are correspondences 
whose  values  lie  in  compact  sets,  their  composition  g o h  is  upper  semi- 
continuous,  in the sense that  pS*p,  pS opt,  and pS'  E (g  o h)(pS)  for s =  1, 
2, ..  .,  implies p' E  (g  o h)(p).  Thus F  is  upper semi-continuous  and  convex 
valued. Since S x X is convex, and compact by the Auxiliary Assumption, there 
is (p*, x*) such that (p*, x*) E  F(p*, x*) by the fixed point theorem of Kakutani 
[12]. The mapping is illustrated in Figure 1. 
To  show that a fixed  point  of  F  leads  to  a  competitive  equilibrium for the 
economy  E = (Y,Xi,  Xi, i =  1, .  . ,  m), we must show that Conditions (I), (II), 
and  (III)  are  met  by  xi* E  4,i(p*), y* =  h(x*),  and p*  E  g(h(x*)).  Consider 
p*  E g(h(x*)).  From  the  definition  of  g  it  follows  that p*  y*  =0,  where y 
=  h(x*),  andp*  y  S( 0 for ally  E  Y. Thus Condition (I) is met forp*  and y*. 
Now  suppose that all consumers have income,  that is, for all i there is xi E  Xi 
such thatp*  *  xi < 0. Then #i(p*)  = (i(p*)  and xi* E Xi. Then insatiability within 
x  nfY implies thatp* *  xi* = 0 if x* E  Y. In any casep*  *  xi* S0  must hold, and 
x,>  ixi for xi such that p *  xi <  0 by definition of (i. Thus Condition (II) holds 
for p*  and x*.  To prove Condition (III), consider y* = h(x*)  =  ax* + (1 -a)y 
where  a  is  maximal  for y*  E  Y.  Then  p* Iy* = 0 =  ap* *  x* + (1 -  a)p*  y. 
Since y  E interior  Y, p*  * y  < 0,  and by definition of f, p* *  x* < 0.  If a >  1 it 
follows  that x* E  Y. Then  non-satiation in X  n  Y implies p* *  x* = 0.  This is 
incompatible with p* *  y* = 0. However, if 0 <  a S  1, p* *  y*  = 0 requires a =  1 
and p* *  x* = 0. Thus x* =y*  and  Condition  (III)  of  competitive  equilibrium 
also holds. 
This  proves  that  a  fixed  point  of  F  is  a  competitive  equilibrium  if  all 
consumers have  income  at p*.  Some  consumers must have  income  since z E 
interior Y implies p* *  z < 0,  and by Assumption (5') there is x~  E  X  n interior Y. 
Therefore, p*  x-i  < 0  holds for some i where x-i  E Xi. Let I  =  {i I  p* *  xi < 0  for 
some xi E  Xi}.  Let I2 =  {  1, ... .,  m} -  I  and suppose I2 is not empty. Suppose 
there is  x  E f(p*)  and  x  E  X  n  Y. By  Assumption  (6'),  there  is y'  E Y and 
wE  12 such  that  x  = -  X,-wand  x'>ixi  for  all  iEl1,  and  x'>-ixi  for 
some i E  II.  These relations are well defined  since xi E  Xi for i E  I,  from the THEOREM  ON EXISTENCE  827 
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FIGURE  I-FOr  (P, X) E  S X X',  F(p, x) =  ( g(h(x)), f(p)) C S x X, where X is the convex 
hull of X and 0. 
definition of (i.  Also  non-satiation  in X  fl  Y and the definition of (i  imply that 
p*  *  XI  > 0  must hold. On the other hand, p*  y'S  0, and p*  x12  =  0 by defini- 
tion of {i~.  This implies p*  w < 0  contradicting w E  X12, since p*.* x  >  0 for all 
x E  X,2, that is, no  one in '2  has income. Then it must be that '2 =0  and all 
consumers have income. In other words, (p*, y*, xi*  i =  1, ... .,  m) is an equilib- 
rium of F. 
On  the other hand,  if f(p*) A (x  n  Y) =0,  that is,  (,(p*)  c  Y-X  ,  but 
1(I,p*) n  (Y -X,2)  =  0,  the transitivity of preference for the members of I1 will 
be violated on the boundary of Y -X  in the relative topology of  Y -X,2.  That 
iS: 
LEMMA  1: If  (p*, x*)  is a fixed point of F, f(p*)  and X  n  Y have a nonempty 
intersection. 
Define  the feasible  set F1 for consumers  in  IY  as  Ft  =  Yd-fi  92i  The extended 
feasible  set for  Is  is F1 =  Yp  -  X  F1 is properly  contained  in F1, and F1 and F1 
are convex and closed with nonempty interiors. Let B be the boundary of F1 in 
the relative  topology  of F1, and let B' =  B  A  x1.  Assume f(p*)  A (x  A Y) =  0. 
Then there is xhad  E  p f(p*)  where x7 E  F1-  Ft.  By Assumption (5') there is a 
point  il  E  F.  Since  bu,  Fd  , and  Fr  are all convex, the line segment from  -  to 
x7L  must lie in  Ap  F1 and intersect B'. Thus B' is not empty. 828  LIONEL  W.  MCKENZIE 
If no members of I,  are satiated at p*, Assumption (2) implies that {  x*},  is a 
Pareto optimal allocation for I,  over all allocations feasible in F1. Assumptions 
(1) and (2) imply that the preference relation Xi may be represented on Xi by a 
real valued utility function that is continuous and positive valued. See Debreu [6, 
pp. 56-59]. We may take 0 to be the greatest lower bound of ui on Xi for all i and 
1  to  be  the  least  upper  bound.  Let  U,  be  the  utility  possibility  set  for  I, 
consumers over F1, and let U1 be the utility possibility set for I,  consumers over 
F,.  Let ui*  =  ui  (x,*). Since u* =  {  ui*  }I, is undominated in F1, it is undominated 
in  F1.  If  there  were  a  point  x =  {xi}),  E  F1  with  ui(xi) =  ui(x1') for  i E II, 
X  =  S7  *xi  would lie in f(p*)  with x E X n  Y. This contradicts the assumption 
that f(p*)  n (X  n  Y) = 0.  Therefore u* is not an element of  Ul. 
Define  the social utility function for II,  v(x)  = max a  such that ui(xi) >  aui*, 
i E II, where the maximum is taken over allocations {  xi  }I, such that E ixi  = x, 
xi E  Xi.  To  see  that  v  is  continuous,  consider  xi '-  xi,  a' --  a  where  as  is 
maximal for xS = Eicxi'.  It is clear from the continuity of ui that ui(xi) > au,i* 
must hold in the limit. But if there were e > 0 such that ui(xi) > (a +  e)ui* held 
for  i E II,  ui(xi5) > (aS + (e/2))ui*  would  hold,  for  large s,  contradicting  the 
maximality of  a s. Also  v  inherits the quasi-concavity properties of  ui, derived 
from Assumption (2). 
I claim v has no maximum on the set B'.  Suppose b provided a maximum for 
v over B'.  It must be that v(b) <  1, that is, ui(bi) <  ui* holds for some i, where 
bi  I,  is  a  maximizing  allocation  of  b.  Otherwise ui(bi) >  ui(x1*), i E I,,  and 
u* E  U1, which we have seen to be impossible. Since b E Fl,  it is feasible and by 
Assumption  (2)  and  (6')  there  is  a  point  w E  Fi  such  that  c =  b +  w  and 
v(c)>>  v(b).  Since  c  lies  in  the  cone  from  the  origin  spanned  by  F1  and 
x* E F1 -  F,  the line segment from c to xj* cuts B in a point z. Indeed, c and  jc 
both in XI. implies that z E  B'. It is shown in Appendix II that z may be chosen 
distinct from c.  Therefore, Assumption  (2)  and  the definition  of  v  imply  that 
v(z)  >  v(b),  so  b  does  not  provide  a  maximum  for  v  over  B'.  This  is  a 
contradiction  of  the  fact  that  B'  is  compact  and  v  is  continuous.  Thus  the 
assumption that f(p*)  n (X  n  Y) = 0  must be rejected. 
If  some  members  of  1,  are  satiated,  it  follows  from  the  impossibility  of 
satiation in the feasible set according to Assumption (6') that u* does not lie in 
Ul.  Then the proof proceeds as before and Pareto optimality of  {  xi }  II. in F1 is 
not needed. This completes the proof of  Lemma  1. The argument is illustrated 
for the case where Y = R  n  in Figure 2. 
Lemma 1 together with the previous argument implies that the case where all 
consumers have income atp*  is the only possible case. Therefore, the equilibrium 
proved to exist for this case must exist in general. 
We have proved the following theorem. 
THEOREM  2.: If an economy E = (Y,Xi,  Xi, i =  1, . . . , m) satisfies the Assump- 
tions (1), (2), (3), (4), (5'), and (6'), there is a competitive  equilibrium  for E. 
The interiority assumption of (5') is easily removed. We will say more about 
this  when  recent  remarks on  free  disposal  are  discussed  later. However,  two THEOREM  ON EXISTENCE  829 
P*  maximal trade for I, 
k 
F  0\  ,  X 
X,  n  XI, 
knegative  of maximal trade for I2 
v(x* ) >  v(b). 
v(c)  >  v(b). 
..v(z)  >  v(b). 
b does not max v on B'. 
I2  cannot survive without trade. 
Y=  -Rn,  F,  =Rn  _ X12. 
No  equilibrium exists in Fl,  but (p*, x*,  i-1,  ...m)  is 
an  equilibrium  with  Emx1*  =  x*  E  F  1-Fl. 
v has no maximum on B'=  B n X,A. 
This may be viewed as an Edgeworth box with the initial 
allocation at 0. 
FIGURE 2. 
assumptions are weakened following Moore. The survival assumption is removed 
and the assumption of irreducibility is weakened. 
The proof of Lemma 1 allows us to see with clarity why a weaker irreducibility 
assumption  used  by  James  Moore  [21,  p.  272-273],  suffices  to  establish  the 
existence  of  a  compensated  equilibrium. His  result requires that  all  the  fixed 
points of F should have x* E X  n  Y. This is true if Lemma 1 holds. However, in 
the proof of Lemma 1 only the weak inequality v(b +  w) >  v(b) was used, where 
w # 0 and w E  Y-X12. 
3.  A WEAKER PREFERENCE  RELATION 
The  other  direction  in  which  the  classical  theorem  has  been  substantially 
strengthened  is  to  remove  the  requirement  that  the  preference  relation  be 
transitive and  complete.  This  process  was  begun  by  Sonnenschein  [28]  and 
brought to fruition by Mas-Colell [16] and Gale and Mas-Colell [9]. Later a more 
general theorem was proved in a very efficient way by Shafer and Sonnenschein 
[26] and applied to competitive equilibrium by Shafer [25]. Sonnenschein showed 
that the existence of  a well defined  demand function  does  not  depend  on  the 
transitivity of preference. He  also showed that the demand function  would be 
upper semi-continuous if preferences are continuous. However, this still does not 830  LIONEL  W.  MCKENZIE 
allow the demand correspondence to be used in the customary ways in proofs of 
existence  of  equilibrium since  the value  of  the correspondence need  not  be  a 
convex set, even though the preferred point set is convex. The proof of existence 
of equilibrium without transitivity was given first by Mas-Colell, and then in a 
slightly different form by Mas-Colell and Gale. Whether the preference relation 
Xi is complete seems to be a matter of definition, since x  incomparable with y 
can be replaced harmlessly by x indifferent to y  in the absence of transitivity. 
Let Pi(x)  be the set of commodity bundles y  such that y  >- ix.  Assumption (2) 
may be weakened to: 
(2')  A preference correspondence Pi is defined on Xi into the 
collection of subsets of Xi, i =  1,  ...  ,  m. The correspondence 
Pi is open valued relative to Xi and lower semi-continuous. Also 
xi X  convex hull Pi(xi). 
Assumption (2') is a major weakening of (2) since it does not require >-i  to be 
transitive, or even  asymmetric, and  no  convexity  assumption  is  made  on  the 
relation Xi (defined by x  iy if and only if -y  >- ix). As mentioned above, even 
though  transitivity  and  asymmetry  of  >-i  were  introduced  and  Pi(x)  were 
assumed  convex,  the  non-convexity  of  Xi  would  still require a  new  proof  of 
existence since the value of the demand correspondence need not be convex or 
even connected. On this point, see Mas-Colell [16]. 
Because Assumption (2') does not include convexity and transitivity of prefer- 
ence in the sense of Assumption (2), the argument that excluded fixed points of F 
involving  xi' Ee  Xi -  Xi  in  the  proof  of  Theorem  2  can  no  longer  be  made. 
Therefore, to prove existence with the preference correspondences Pi we intro- 
duce a stronger assumption of irreducibility. We assume: 
(6")  However I1 and I2 may be selected, if x,  =Y  -  X12  with xj, E XI, 
y  E  Y, and x,2E  X,2  then there is alsoy'  E  Y and w E X,2, such that 
'2  erEi  ls 
x  y'-x,2-w  and xi'  E P(xi)  for all i  E II. 
Assumption (6") is stronger than (6') in two respects. The point x,2 may be in the 
enlarged possible consumption set Xs,2 and it must be possible for an additional 
trade from YI2  to improve the position of all consumers belonging to II.  Then 
Lemma 1 is no longer needed. 
A device introduced by Shafer [24] and exploited by Shafer and Sonnenschein 
[26]  will  allow  us  to  use  a  mapping  of  the  social  consumption  set  on  the 
boundary of the production possibility set, as before. Then the proof of existence 
for a production economy under quite weak conditions may be derived. The trick 
is to define a new preference relation that is transitive, by means of a preference 
correspondence Ri conditioned  on  x E Xi.  First, define  Pi' by  P'(x)  =  convex 
hull Pi(x)  for x  E Xi. It is easily seen that Pi' satisfies Assumption  (2') and, in 
addition,  it  is  convex  valued.  Let  Gi denote  the graph of  Pi',  and  denote  by 
d((x, z), Gi) the Euclidean distance from (x, z) E Xi x  Xi to  Gi. Define  Ri(x, y) THEOREM  ON EXISTENCE  831 
for x E Xi  andy  e  Xi by 
Ri(x,y)  =  {zjd((x,z),Gi)  < d((x,y),Gi)},  ifyy  M Pi'(x),  and 
Ri(x, y)  =  {z I  d((x,z),  Gic)  > d((x,  y), GiC  )},  if y  E Pi'(x). 
Gic is the complement of Gi in Xi x  Xi. For any given x E Xi, Ri(x, y)  defines a 
transitive and  symmetric preference relation  on  Xi.  Because  d((x, z), G)  is  a 
continuous  function  of  (x, z),  Ri(x, y)  is  a  continuous  correspondence.  This 
justifies the following lemma. 
LEMMA  2:  Ri is a continuous  correspondence  mapping  Xi x  Xi into the collection 
of subsets  of Xi,  i =  1, . ..  , m. 
Now we use Ri to define a pseudo-demand correspondence  ;(p, x), where p is 
a price vector and x E Xi. Let  ,i  (p, x) =  {y  E Xi Ip *  y  < 0 and p *  z < 0 implies 
y  E Ri  (x, z)}.  That is,  ,i  (p, x) is the set of commodity bundles y  such that (x, y) 
is as close to Gi (or as far from Gic)  as (x, z) for any commodity bundle z in the 
budget set defined  by p.  Let  g  be  the convex  hull of  this set. It is clear that 
$(p, x) is contained in the budget set. 
I claim that $(p,  x)  is upper semi-continuous at (p, x)  if there is z E Xi such 
that p *  z < 0, that is, if the ith consumer has income.  Suppose pS -  p,  xs -*  x, 
yS+y,  s =  1,2,  . . .,  where  yS  e  j,(pS,xs)  and  (xs)  e Xi.  Consider  w e  Xi 
where p  w < 0.  The  existence  of  z  implies  that  the  budget  set  B(p')  =  {z 
e  Xi I  p'  z < 0}  is  a  continuous  correspondence at p' = p.  Then,  for  s  large, 
there is  ws  E Xi such that pS  * ws  < 0  and  wS -> w.  By definition  of  j(ps,xS) 
yS =ljszjS  where  zjs  E B(ps)  n  Ri(xs,ws)  and  ?lajs  =  1,  ajS > o,  all  j. 
Since the Xi are bounded by the Auxiliary Assumption, Zjs  is bounded for each], 
and  a  subsequence may be  chosen  which  converges for Zis  and  ajS. Retaining 
notation, let zjs -*zj,  ajS>  aj,  all j.  Then y =  EI1ajzj.  But, by Lemma 2, Ri is 
continuous, so Zj E Ri  (x, w). Since w is an arbitrary element of B (p),  this implies 
Zj E (i(p, x)  and, therefore, y  E $(p,  x).  Thus g  is upper semi-continuous.  It is 
convex valued by definition. We have shown the following lemma to be true. 
LEMMA  3:  The correspondence  g  is upper  semi-continuous  and convex valued at 
(p, x) if there is w E  Xi such that p* w < 0. 
We define fi'(p, x) in a manner similar to the definition of 4pi(p), that is, 
fi'(p, x) = $(p,  x)  if there is w E Xi andp  w < 0, 
fi'(p, x) = { ye  Xi |p  .y  =  O},  otherwise. 
We may prove the following lemma. 
LEMMA  4:  The correspondence  fi' is upper  semi-continuous  and convex valued  for 
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The result follows from Lemma 3 if there is w such that p* w < 0. If p* w > 0 
for  all  w E  Xi, f'(p,  x)  is  the  intersection of  the  budget  set  with Xi  and  thus 
convex  valued.  Upper  semi-continuity  follows  from  the  arguments of  Debreu 
appealed to earlier in the case of i4i(p). 
We  may  now  define  a  mapping F'  whose  fixed  points  will  be  competitive 
equilibria for an economy E =  (Y,  Xi, Pi, i =  1, . . . , m) that satisfies (1), (2'), (3), 
(4), (5'), and (6"). First, define f'  on S x  J1'  Xi by f'(p,  Hl  j'xi)  =  1fJ  'f(p,  xi). Thus 
f'(p,  Jjfl'xi)  c  Rm". Correspondences h and g  may be  defined as before in the 
definition of the mapping F. Let F'(p, Jj  l'xi) = ((g  o h)(  ',xi),  f'(p,  17  Jjxi)). Then 
F' maps S x  j  J7X,i  into the collection of subsets of S x  J'ljXl*.  Since the values of 
g,  h, f',  and fi'  lie  in  compact  sets  and  each  is  continuous  or  upper semi- 
continuous,  F  is upper semi-continuous. Since g o h is convex  valued and  not 
empty as before, and  fJ,fi'  is also convex valued and not empty, F'  has these 
properties. Then the Kakutani fixed point theorem provides a fixed point for F' 
on S x  fl7,Xi. 
We  must  show  that  the  fixed  point  of  F'  is  a  competitive  equilibrium. 
However, first we will slightly modify condition II to read 
(IIr)  Xi  E Xi andp  *  xi <  0, andp  *  z > 0 for any z E P(xi), 
i=  L,...,m. 
This  condition  implies  (II)  whenever  i  can  be  consistently  defined  as  a 
complete weak ordering over Xi. However, (II') is not as restrictive as (II) since 
(II') allows both x E Pi(y)  andy  E Pi(x). 
Lower  semi-continuity  of  P,  and  thus  of  Pi',  plays  a  role  like  local  non- 
satiation  in  the  present context  to  imply  the  spending  of  all  income  for  the 
pseudo-demand functions at a fixed point. 
LEMMA  5: If x E f'(p,x),  then  p *  x =  0. 
The  definition  of f'(p,  x)  implies p* x  < 0.  Suppose p *  x < 0.  Then f'(p,  x) 
=  (p, x).  Thus we only  need  consider the case x  E $(p,  x).  Suppose there is 
z E- i(p, x)  and  (x, z) E Gi,  that  is,  z E  P(x).  Then  y  E  i(p,  x)  implies  y 
E Pi'(x), that is, (x, y)  E Gi. This implies x  E  Pi'(x) by convexity of Pi,  contra- 
dicting  Assumption  2'.  Therefore,  4f(p, x) n  Pi'(x) = 0.  On  the  other  hand, 
px  <0  implies  there is y e  i(p,  x)  and p  y  <0.  Thus  the  result follows  if 
p  y  < 0 implies that (x, y)  cannot be a closest point to Gi of the form (x, z) for 
whichp  *  z < 0. 
Suppose otherwise and let (x, z)  be a point of Gi closest to (x, y).  Let xS o  x, 
s =  1,2,...,  where xS lies on  the line segment from x  to x-. By  lower semi- 
continuity  of  P,'  there  is  a  sequence  z sz  where  (x  s, z  s) E  Gi.  Choose  a 
sequence (x,ws)  -(x,y),  where wS =  asy + (1-  a5)zs and 0 <  as <  1. Convex- 
ity of Xi implies wS  E Xi. Also zS -  wS =  as  (z  -  y). We may choose as so that 
as5Izs-yI  < IZ--yI  for large s. This together  with Ixs-  xI < Ix-xl  implies 
for large s, I  (xS, z)  -  (x, ws)  I <  I  (X,  -  (x, y) 1.  But for s large p  w s < 0. Since 
(xs,zs)  E Gi, y  :  R1(x,ws)  for  large s.  This  contradicts y  E&  i(p,x),  and  the 
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Consider  (p*,x$,  .x  .  ,  x,*) E  F'(p*,xl,...  ,  x,*).  Let  x*  =  2'xi*,  where  xi* 
E  fj'(p*, xi*). Then by Lemma 5, p* *  = 0. Also y*  E h(x*).  Then p* *  < 0, 
together  withy*  =  ax * +  (1  -  a)9,  from  the definition  of h, andp*  *  y  =  0 from 
the definition of g, gives a =  1. Thus x* = y*.  Since p* *  y  < 0 for y  E  Y follows 
from the definition of g, and y*  E  Y from the definition of h, Conditions (I) and 
(III) are satisfied. 
The verification of Condition (II') like that of Condition (II) is less simple than 
the verification of  (I)  and  (III),  in  this instance  because  the maximization  of 
preference in fi'(p*, xi*) is relative to xi' by way of a pseudo-preference ordering. 
As before, make the provisional assumption that all consumers have income at 
p*, that is, for each i there is w e  Xi andp*  *  w < 0. Thenfi' =  g  and x,i' E  (p * 
xi*). By  definition  of  g  it  must  hold  that  xi* Ee  Xi  and p* *  xi* < 0.  Also  xi* 
=~j  E+Oz1,ao1j  >0O,  E  I +  1a1j  =  1, where  zj E  R(p*,  xi*),  that is, Zj E R1(xi*, y)  for 
allj  and for anyy  E Xi such thatp*  .y  S 0, andp  p  zj S  0. Let Fi be the smallest 
affine subspace containing Xi. We will need the following lemma: 
LEMMA  6:  If y E interior  Pi'(x) relative to Fi, then (x, y)  E interior Gi relative to 
Xi x  Xi. 
The proof follows from the fact that Pi' is lower semi-continuous and convex 
valued. Supposey  E  interior  P(x)  relative to Fi. Then there is a neighborhood N 
of y  in Fi such that N  C Pi'(x).  Indeed, we  may  choose  N  to  be  the interior, 
relative  to Fi, of  the  convex  hull  of points  wj E  Pi'(x), j  =  1, . ..  , ni +  1, where  ni 
is the dimension of Fi. Let y  be an arbitrary element of N.  Theny  =e  I+lajwj 
for  unique aj with  2,aj =  1, and  aj > 0,  all j.  We  must  show  that  any  point 
(x5, y')  sufficiently  near  (x, y)  belongs  to  Gi. Suppose  not.  Then  there is  a 
sequence  (x5, y5) -*  (x, y)  and y'5 M P(x5).  However, by  lower semi-continuity 
for any sequence x' -  x,  there is a sequence wj' E Pj'(x5)  with wj'  -  wj, for all j. 
The affine independence of the wj implies the affine independence of wjs  for large 
s. Therefore,  yS  =  ?n +Iajyswjs  for unique  ajs  for large s,  where E af  =  1. Since 
ys5y  and  wjs->wj,  it  must  be  that  aJs-->a1.  Otherwise,  a  subsequence  of  ajs 
could be chosen converging to aj, where a) #  aj  for somej,  andy  = EI +la/w  , 
in  contradiction  to  the  uniqueness  of  the  aj.  Thus  ajs > 0  for  s  large,  and 
yS E Pj'(xs) by the convexity of P/(xs).  This proves the lemma. 
To  verify Condition  (II'), we  must  show  that y  E Pi(x*)  implies p*  y  > 0. 
Assume  the  contrary, that is, y  E Pi(xi*) and p* *  y  < 0.  However, y  E Pi(x,") 
implies y E Pj'(x,*). Since all consumers have income, there is w E Xi satisfying 
p*  w < 0. It is clear that w may be chosen interior to Xi relative to Fi. Let Sj(w) 
be an c-ball in Fi about w contained in Xi. Consider Na  =  ay + (1 -  a)Sj(w).  N,a 
is an open set relative to Fi and contained in Xi for all a with 0 < a <  1. Since 
y  E Pj'(x,*) and  Pj'(x?")  is  open  relative to  Xi,  for a  near  1, Na c  P'(x,).  Let 
y'  E Na,  so  that y'  E interior  P'(xi*)  relative  to  Fi.  Then  (xi,> y')  E interior Gi 
relative  to  Xi x  Xi  by  Lemma  6,  and  d((x?", y'),  G,c) >  0.  But  xi*  is  a  convex 
combination  of  n +  1 points  z1  E  (p *,x?K). Thus p*  y' < 0  implies  that  Zj 
E  Ri(xi*,  y'). Then, by definition of Ri, d((x,?, zj), Gj) > 0 must hold for allj.  In 
other  words,  (xi*, zj) E  Gi,  or  Zj  E  P'(x"*),  all j.  Since  Pi'  is  convex  valued,  it 834  LIONEL W. MCKENZIE 
follows that x* E P1'(xi*).  But Pi'(xi*)  is the convex hull of Pi(x,"), which contra- 
dicts Assumption (2') and establishes Condition (II') of competitive equilibrium. 
This argument is  analogous  to  an  argument of  Shafer and  Sonnenschein  [26], 
where Gi was assumed to be an open graph. 
An argument parallel to that in the case of Theorem 2 shows that on the basis 
of (5') and (6") every consumer does in fact have income for any fixed point of 
F'.  We  have  shown  for  a  fixed  point  (p*, x*)  of  F'  that  x* = y*  where 
x* ef'(p*,J  gx)  andy*  E  Y. Thus by the definition of f'  we find x* E  X  n Y. 
As before, Assumption (5') implies that someone has income at p*,  so the set I, 
of consumers with income is not empty. Suppose the set I2 of consumers without 
income is not empty. Then by Assumption (6"), there is y' E  Y and w E X,2 such 
that x,  = y' -  x-  w and xi' E Pi(x?")  for all i E II. Then xi' E Pi'(x?")  also holds 
and  (xi*, xi') E Gi.  Since  (xi*, xi*) X  Gi  by  Assumption  (2'),  xi' E Ri(x", xi*). 
Therefore, p** xi' > p*  xi* by  definition  of  '(p*,x*).  Then,  by  Lemma  5, 
xi' > 0 must hold for all i. However, p* *  x* = 0 for i E '2  by definition off'. 
Also p* *  y'  <  0 since p*  supports Y, and p* w >  0 since wE  XI2, which is also 
supported byp*.  Thusp*  xl  p*  y'-p*  *  x12-p*  *  w < 0 in contradiction to 
p*  xi' > 0. Therefore, I2 = 0  and all consumers have income. Thus we have the 
following theorem: 
THEOREM  3:  If  an  economy  E  =  (Y,Xi,Pi,  i =  1, . . . , m)  satisfies  the Assump- 
tions (1), (2'), (3), (4), (5'), and (6"), there is a competitive  equilibrium  for E. 
Except for the interiority assumption of  (5'), this is the modern form of  the 
classical theorem on existence of competitive equilibrium that was promised. Its 
major improvements are the removal of  the survival assumption based  on  the 
work of Moore and the discard of transitivity of the preference relation based on 
the work of Sonnenschein, Shafer, Mas-Colell, and Gale. The interiority assump- 
tion is made only for simplicity. A method for its removal will be described in the 
next section. 
However,  the  greatly weakened  assumption  on  preferences for  Theorem  3 
required  that  the  irreducibility  assumption  be  significantly  stronger  than 
Moore's. Irreducibility was assumed for an economy  with expanded  consump- 
tion sets Xi and the improvement for I2 consumers was positive for all i E  I2. 
This stronger form of  irreducibility would  actually be  needed  even  for prefer- 
ences  of  the  type  assumed  by  Debreu  [7] where  thick  indifference  sets  were 
allowed  and  transitivity was retained. Otherwise, the  contradiction  that estab- 
lishes I2 = 0  is not available, since x,'>.  xix*  does not imply p *  x,  > p *  x  when 
indifference sets may be  thick, that is, when x >-  iy  and z =  ax + (1 -  a)y  for 
0 <  a <  1 only implies z  iy. 
4.  FREE DISPOSAL 
The question of free disposal, or more generally, the question of interiority, for 
existence of equilibrium was essentially settled in McKenzie  [19]. However, the 
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sets that are linear subspaces, in particular, the case where Y = {O}.  A hint was 
given in  the Econometrica reprint volume  [19, p.  350, fn.  13] on  how  the gap 
should be repaired, but the original omission may still lead to confusion. There 
have been recent articles, in particular Hart and Kuhn [10], and Bergstrom [3], 
providing alternative proofs that "free disposal" is not needed as an assumption. 
These  proofs  are, of  course, valuable  to  have,  but  the  original proof  can  be 
recommended for simplicity and intuitive appeal. Thus it may be worthwhile to 
provide the missing steps from the  1959 argument, particularly since the recent 
proofs have  interiority assumptions stronger than  the  second  part of  (5). The 
final form of the interiority assumption is 
(5")  relative interior X  n  relative interior Y #  0. 
This is  the  second  part of  (5),  from which  the  survival assumption has  been 
removed. The interior is taken relative to the smallest linear subspace containing 
X, or Y, respectively. 
The technique for reducing (5') to (5") is to expand  Y so that it acquires an 
interior in such a way that a relative interior point given by (5") is interior to  Y, 
thus re-establishing (5'). Then an equilibrium exists for the modified system. The 
modification is made to depend continuously on a parameter e  > 0 in such a way 
that  c =  0  corresponds to  the  original model.  The  equilibria for  Es  as  r5s  -0, 
s =  1,2,  ...  ,  lie  in  a  compact  set,  and  the  limit  of  the  equilibria  (ps, ys,  xis 
i=  1, ..  .,  m) for a converging subsequence is an equilibrium for E. Conditions 
(I)  and  (III) hold  in  the limit from the continuity  of  sum and  inner product. 
Condition (II) of Theorems 1 and 2 follows from the upper semi-continuity of the 
demand correspondence, once it is shown that all consumers have income at the 
limit price vector p,  as a consequence of  Assumption (5") and (6) or (6'). The 
argument of McKenzie [19, p. 64] may be used for this purpose. However, for the 
case  of  Theorems 2  and  3, Xi  should  be  replaced by  X_ and  X  by  X  in  the 
argument. Assumption (5") implies that relative interior X n  relative interiorY 
#4  0.  To  establish (II') in the case of  Theorem 3 note  that p *  xi <  0 holds  by 
continuity when xi is a limit point of xis and apply the same argument used to 
establish (II') for Es.  The proof is simpler than in McKenzie [19] since it is no 
longer necessary to  move  the Xi. Formerly, Xi was moved  to provide a point 
interior to  Xi n  Y that would  guarantee income  for  the  ith  consumer  in  the 
modified economy Es. This role is now played in the same way in E and Es by 
Assumption (6') or (6"). 
If  Y is not a linear subspace, let x  E  relative interior X  n relative interior Y. 
The  existence  of x- results  from  (5").  Let S(x-)  =  {y  j  y  y-  I S  e),  where  e >  0 is 
chosen  sufficiently  small  so  that  Assumptions  (3)  and  (4)  are protected.  Let 
Y(e)  =  {y  jy  =  aw  +  /z,  where  a >  0, /8  0, w E  Y, and  z E SE(5x)). Y(e)  is the 
convex  cone  spanned from the origin by  Y and  S,(x-). Then x E  int Y(e) and 
Assumption  (5')  is  satisfied. Thus  there is  an  equilibrium by  Theorem  3  for 
E(e)  =  (Y(e),  Xi, Pi,  i =  1, ...  ,  m),  and similarly for Theorem 2. We must show 
that  the  equilibria  (pS,  ySxiS,  i =  1, . . . , m)  lie  in  a  compact  set  as  e5-O0. 
Eventually  Y(es) C  Y(e)  for  an  e >  0,  and  Y(e) nR  =  {0).  Therefore,  Xi 836  LIONEL W. MCKENZIE 
bounded below implies thatys  and xi' are bounded over s by the usual argument 
(McKenzie [19, p. 62]). To bound pS, renormalize the prices given by Theorem 3 
by setting I  pSI =  1. By letting e  tend to 0, the existence of an equilibrium for E is 
established  in  the  way  described  above.  Note  that  Y  may  contain  a  linear 
subspace, although it is not equal to a linear subspace. 
If  Y is a linear subspace, the construction is slightly more complicated. An 
n +  1st  pseudo-good  is  introduced  into  the  model.  Let  Y' =  {y E R  ?1I 
(Y1, .*  ..  ,y  n)  E  Y and Yn+  I 6 0).  Since (0, -1)  E  Y', the pseudo-good  is freely 
disposable.  Let  x E relative  interiorX n relative  interior Y  as  before.  Define 
SIE(5x-  1)=  { y E Rn+11 IlY  -  (x~- 1)1  <  E, where e <  1Ix,-1I1).  Define Xi'  = { x 
E  Rn+1  I (xl,  . . .,  xn) E  Xi and xn+I =  -1/)m}.  Define  Y'(e) as before and (5") 
is  satisfied.  Then  by  the  previous  argument  an  equilibrium exists  for  E'(e) 
= (Y'(E),Xi',Pi",  i =  1, . . .,  m),  where y  E Pi"(x)  if  and  only  if  (yi,  . . . ,yn) 
E  Pj(x,  . . . , xn). As e -*0,  and the productivity of the pseudo-good disappears, 
any limit of the pS has pns  I = 0. Therefore, a limit (p, y, xi, i =  1, . . . , m) of the 
equilibria for E'(e), as e -  0, is an equilibrium for E when the coordinate n +  1 is 
ignored. Since Y =  {0} is a possibility, the pure trade economy without disposal 
is covered by this argument. 
5.  ROLE OF THE FIRM 
It is an unusual characteristic of my contributions to the theory of existence of 
equilibrium that the social production set has been represented by a convex cone. 
I would claim that this properly represents the Walrasian system where produc- 
tion processes rather than firms are featured, but also it is a fair representation of 
a Marshallian economy of competitive industries where firm size is small relative 
to the market and firms operate in a small neighborhood of the minimum cost 
points  on  their  U-shaped  cost  curves. The  representation of  the  competitive 
economy as a fixed collection of disparate firms maximizing profit over concave 
production functions probably dates from Hicks'  Value and Capital [11], but it 
was taken up by  Arrow and  Debreu  [1]. Wald  [31, 32] had  used a  simplified 
Walrasian  model.  My  own  initial  contribution  [17]  was  in  the  context  of 
Graham's model of world trade which was also linear. However, I have contin- 
ued to regard the linear process model to be the appropriate ideal type for the 
competitive economy. 
It should be remarked that in a strict mathematical sense the models of Walras 
and Hicks are equivalent, without resort to approximations. In one direction this 
is obvious since linear processes may be assigned to Hicksian firms leading to a 
social production  set  that is  a  cone.  This is  a  Hicksian  model  without  scarce 
unmarketed resources. In the other direction an artificial construction is needed. 
An entrepreneurial  factor is introduced for each firm which is divided among the 
owners in proportion to their ownership shares. This factor is always supplied 
and  freely  disposable.  The  production  set  Yj of  the jth  firm is  displaced  by 
appending  minus  one  unit  of  the jth  entrepreneurial factor  to  each  of  its THEOREM  ON EXISTENCE  837 
input-output vectors and setting all other entrepreneurial inputs equal to zero. 
The new production set  Yi, for a unit input of entrepreneurship, lies in a space 
R"n/  when there are 1 firms. Then the social production set Y is taken to be the 
closure of the set, E7ia' Yj, aj >  0. The only part of the set Y that contributes to 
an equilibrium is its intersection with the hyperplane defined by setting entrepre- 
neurial components equal to  -  1. This set is not affected by taking the closure. 
The  pricing of  the  entrepreneurial factors will  provide for  the  distribution of 
profits by the firms and the order of proof is the same as before. 
On the other hand, my own preference is to regard the entrepreneurial factors 
as no different from other goods,  suffering indeed from some indivisibilities in 
the real world, but approximated in the competitive model by divisible goods just 
as in the case of  television sets and steel mills. Viewed this way the use of  the 
production cone  approximates the basic competitive notion  of  free entry more 
closely than Hicks' unmarketed factors. In the firm model of Hicks and Arrow- 
Debreu a firm becomes  active whenever its profit becomes  nonnegative.  How- 
ever, the list of firms is given and for Hicks, at least, identified with the list of 
consumers. Trouble immediately arises if firms are run by coalitions of people, 
that  is,  entrepreneurial factors  can  be  supplied  to  a  firm  by  more  than  one 
consumer. Merely earning a positive return does not  then activate a firm, as a 
potential coalition, unless the profit is sufficient to match the earnings that the 
coalition members already receive elsewhere. Suppose entrepreneurial factors do 
not  affect  preferences  directly.  Then  given  the  prices  of  traded  goods,  an 
equilibrium would be  an  allocation  of  profits in  the core of  a profit game, in 
which the firms are coalitions of entrepreneurs rather than single entrepreneurs 
as in the Hicks theory, or unique unreproducible resources as in Arrow-Debreu. 
Let  ej be  a  point  in  RJm, where e, = 1  if  the  ith  entrepreneur is in  the jth 
coalition and e, = 0 otherwise. Let e1  be thejth  column of the matrix [e.] which 
has m rows and 2'  columns. Let 7r  be a point in Rm representing a distribution of 
profits, and let v(ej) be the maximum profits attainable by thejth  coalition at the 
ruling prices. Let e E  Rm be the vector all of whose components equal 1. Then 7r 
is in the core if 77*  ej >  v(ej), for allj,  and there exists 6  E R 2  such that 6. =0  or 
1, all j,  Ej8jej  =  e, and 7  *  ej =  v(e1) if 6j =  1. Under these conditions  there is a 
collection of coalitions accommodating all entrepreneurs  with sufficient profits to 
pay their members at the rate 7r and there is no coalition with enough profits to 
better these rates of pay. 
Unfortunately  the conditions  that will imply  a  nonempty  core  are onerous. 
Scarf [23] has shown that a game has a nonempty core if it is balanced. A game 
with transferable utility is balanced if, for any 6  E  R2.  and 7r E Rm,  Zj  = 
all i, and 77*  ej < v(ej), allj  with 6i > 0, implies that S  * e <  v(e).  There seems no 
reason why these conditions  should be  met. In particular, they imply that the 
problems of  coordination within firms are overcome  by  economies  of  scale in 
production, no matter how large the firms grow. There can always be a single 
firm embracing all entrepreneurs to realize the core allocation. The role of  the 
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There seems no way out of  this difficulty except to allow the distribution of 
effort implied by  6  to be realized in fact, either by a distribution of  time over 
coalitions by individuals or by the presence of  many individuals of  each of  m 
types who may be spread over coalitions. Then the managerial structure of the 
firm appears like a linear activity. The whole set of firms generates Y, a convex 
cone  from  the  origin  in  Rm+  1,  spanned  by  (v(ej), -  ej), j  =  1, . . . , 2m, with 
v(0) =  -  1, to allow free disposal of profit. A competitive equilibrium will exist 
for  the  reduced  economy,  implied  by  given  prices  for  goods  and  marketed 
factors, where Y is the production set. The ith consumer supplies one unit of his 
entrepreneurial factor while demanding  ri units of the output (profit) when the 
price vector is  (1, 7).  In  equilibrium prices for entrepreneurial factors may  be 
normalized on  the price of  profit =  1, since  every vector  in  the  dual  cone  is 
nonnegative  by  virtue of  v(0)  -1.  Let  6' E Rm have  61 = 0  for  ji  and 
6i. =  1. Let  8  E R2  satisfy  8  > 0.  The  equilibrium ((l, 7r), y,x,  . . .  Um) will 
satisfy  (l,7r) *y < 0  for y E  Y,  (1,)  y = 0,  y  = Ej1j(v(ej),-ej),  Ej  jej =  e, 
2,jAjv;  =  7r  * e,  xi  =  (i,  -  6'), y  =  Ei3,i. Thus 7r is in the core when 6  is allowed 
to vary continuously with no further assumptions. 
However, if this way out is chosen there is no advantage over simply treating 
entrepreneurial resources like other resources, in particular, without the restric- 
tion that the amounts of different entrepreneurial  resources in a given activity be 
used in the same amounts, as the coalition model requires, or the restriction that 
entrepreneurial resources do  not  affect  preferences. I  conclude  that  whatever 
resources are brought together to comprise the "unmarketed" resource base of 
the firm are most reasonably treated symmetrically with other resources. Most 
goods in the real world are indivisible, so the competitive model is an approxima- 
tion to reality, but the entrepreneurial  resources, or firms' special resources, seem 
to be no more nor less subject to these reservations than other goods or resources. 
6.  EXTERNAL  ECONOMIES 
Some authors, in particular, McKenzie [18], Arrow and Hahn [2], and Shafer 
and  Sonnenschein  [26,  271 have  relaxed  the  assumption  that  producer  and 
consumer actions are independent except for the balance between demand and 
supply in equilibrium. My  early model made consumer preferences depend on 
the choices of other consumers, the activity levels, and prices. However, feasible 
sets  for  consumers or  producers were kept  independent.  On  the  other  hand, 
Arrow and Hahn, and Shafer and Sonnenschein, as well as others, have allowed 
feasibility  effects  as  well.  The  early model  for  their analyses  was  a  paper of 
Debreu [41 which preceded the existence theorem of Arrow and Debreu. How- 
ever, in the use by Arrow and Debreu of Debreu's results no external economies 
were allowed. 
My omission of  feasibility effects from external economies  was not  an over- 
sight. I did not succeed in formulating such effects in a satisfactory way. It is my 
view that this question remains unresolved. The difficulties can be illustrated by THEOREM  ON EXISTENCE  839 
external economies  between  firms in  an  Arrow-Debreu model.  It  is  usual  to 
assume that a set Y1  exists for the jth  firm that is closed and convex and includes 
every input-output combination  that this firm could  achieve under any  condi- 
tions that can arise. Then there is a continuous correspondence '~J4  for the jth 
firm that maps Y=  fl/ Yj  into the collection of subsets of  Yj. The value of  5j  on 
an element y  of  Y is interpreted as the set of  feasible outputs for the jth  firm 
given that the ith firm, i #1j, is producing yi.  Since yi is chosen from Yi there is 
no guarantee that y  is feasible. The technologically feasible outputs are among 
the fixed points of the product correspondence 5  =  fl  15 which maps Y into the 
collection of subsets of  Y. Since 5j  is assumed to be convex valued, fixed points 
do  exist. Outside the set of  fixed points  the points of  Y cannot be  realized as 
inputs and outputs even when resource supplies are adequate. 
The  competitive  equilibria  are  a  subset  of  the  fixed  points  of  5,  since 
technological feasibility is a necessary condition for equilibrium. However, which 
fixed  points  of  '@? are  equilibria will  depend  on,  among  other  things,  what 
alternative outputs are allowed to the firms, that is, on the precise content of  'j 
for  the jth  firm. Given  the price vector and  the output vector y,  a  necessary 
condition for equilibrium is that p *  yj be a maximum over 5j  (y).  But 5j (y)  has 
no empirical correlates except for the constraints imposed by the set of feasible 
points of 5,  that is, 5j (y)  contains yj if y is a feasible point. Moreover, the set of 
fixed points of  5  may not coincide with the set of technically feasible outputs of 
the economy,  unless  the  GJ  can be  designed  so  that they have  their assumed 
properties without introducing new fixed points. 
In these circumstances the maps  5j (y)  are artificial constructions except for 
the feasible set, that is, the set of fixed points of well defined '?Ji's.  What kinds of 
feasible  sets would  admit  an  appropriate set  of  L5iG's  is  unknown.  Given  that 
otherwise appropriate L5i's exist, the equilibria may then depend on the choice of 
the  correspondences.  Since  the  papers in  the  literature do  not  address  these 
problems it is not clear to what extent the subject has been advanced since 1955. 
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APPENDIX  I 
Lety  = az for z E  interior Y. Suppose x E X and no matter how large a is chosen the number 7T  is 
unbounded.  Then  (a(1  - 7T)/7)z  +  x E  Y  for  all  large  7r. Let  w(a, 7r)  = (a(1  - 7)/7T)z  +  x.  As 
7r  -  oo, w(a, 7r)  -  w(a) =  -  az + x,  which lies in  Y since  Y is closed. Also  w(a)/a  =  -  z + (x/a) 
E  Y, and, as a -o  ,  -  z + (x/a)  -  z, which also lies in Y since Y is closed. Thus z and  -  z are in 
Y, and since z is interior to  Y, Y =  R'  in contradiction to Assumption (4). This shows that a exists 
for any particular x E X. 
Suppose w(a, 7r)  M  Y. Then (a(1  - 7)/7)z  +  x' M  Y will also hold  for x'  near enough  to x.  In 
other words, a  is  effective  for a  sufficiently small open  neighborhood  of  x.  Let  U(x)  be  such  a 
neighborhood, relative to X, for x  E X. Since X is compact, by the Auxiliary Assumption, there is a 
finite set (xi},  i =  1.  N, such that U'=  I  U(xi) = X. Therefore, we may choose a =  max ai, where 
ai is effective for xi. 840  LIONEL W. MCKENZIE 
APPENDIX  II 
We must show that z may be chosen distinct from c. Let C C  R '  be a closed convex set that does 
not contain 0. Define  cone (C) =  {ax I x E  C, a  >  0),  the cone spanned by C from the origin. Let 
D =  {x E C I ax  M C, for 0 < a <  1}. D is the set of points of first contact with C of rays from the 
origin. D  C  C and D is contained in the boundary of C in cone (C),  perhaps properly. We have the 
following proposition: 
PROPOSITION:  Let x  E  D and y be any other  point of C. Then x --y  X  cone (C). 
Suppose x -  y  E  cone (C).  Then there exists a > 0 such that a (x  -  y)  E  C. Since y  also lies in C 
and C is convex, any convex combination of y  and a(x  -  y)  must lie in C. In particular, 
a  _y)]  a  x E  C.  ~y  +  [ax-y] 
Since a/(a  +  1) <  1, this contradicts the assertion that x E  D. 
The  Proposition must be  applied  to  the closed  convex  set F1 and  the cone  with vertex at xl 
spanned  by  Fl,  denoted  cone  (xl,  FI).  Cone  (xl  FI) =  {y  Iy =  ax + (1a-)x  ),x  E  Fl,  a>  0}. 
Assume that c is a point of first contact of a ray from xl  with F1, that is, c E  F1 and xl  +  a(c  -  x*) 
M  F1 for 0 S  a <  1. By choosing xl  to be the origin, we see that the Proposition implies xl  +  c -  b 
=  xl  + w M  cone  (x4, F1). We  will  show  that  this  contradicts  the  choice  of  w  to  lie  in  cone 
(F1) = cone (0, F1). 
Since xl  +  w M  cone (xl,  F1), xl  +  w +  ax + (1 -  a)x1  for a > 0, x E  F1, or (1/a)w  +  xl  M  F1 
for any a  >  0. If xl  =  0  the contradiction follows  from w E  F1.  In any  case, y = (1/a)w  + xl, E 
cone (F1) for all a  >  0 since F1 and thus cone (F1) are convex. However, xl  E  F1 -  F1 and xl  #0 
imply  /8x7 E F1  for  some  ,B >  1,  and  w E  cone  (F1)  implies  yw E  F1  for  some  -y  > 0.  Thus 
8-yw  + (1 -  8)/8x*  E  F1 for all 8  with 0 <  8 <  1. Choose  8  such that (1 -  8)/  =  1. Then x  M  F1 is 
contradicted for the choice of a =  1/8-y, so x*  +  w E  cone (x*,  F1) must hold. This implies that c is 
not a point of first contact of the ray from xl  with F1. Since c E  F1 and x*  M  F1, there must be a 
where  0 <  a <  1  and  x*  +  a(c  -  x*)  E F1.  Let  a  be  the  smallest  value  of  a  satisfying  these 
conditions. Choose z = ac + (1 -  a)x*.  Then z +  c, and z E  boundary F1 in F1, as required. 
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